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Abstract
This paper investigates the concept of aletheia (truth) in ancient philosophy from the pre-
Socratics until Aristotle. The meaning of aletheia in archaic Greek is taken as the starting
point. It is followed by remarks about the concept of truth in the Seven Sages. The author
discusses this concept as it appears in views and works of philosophers and historians. A special
section is devoted to the epistemological and ontological understanding of truth. On this occasion,
in1uential views of Heidegger are examined. The paper is concluded by a review of various
meanings of truth in Aristotle.
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1. Introduction
Tarski claimed that his semantic de:nition of truth conforms to the ordinary analysis
of “true” and philosophically follows Aristotle. The core of Tarski’s analysis is captured
by the T-scheme: a sentence A is true if and only if A. This paper has two goals. Firstly,
I intend to review how the word alehteia was used in archaic Greek and philosophy
until Aristotle in the light of sources as well as some recent (in the last hundred years)
interpretations. Secondly, I would like to derive some lessons about the concept of
correspondence.
A technical note. This paper has no footnotes or endnotes. They are replaced by di-
gressions which begin with the letter D followed by a number and ending by the sign
I. All bibliographical references are inserted directly into the text; these references
are normally made by indicating the author, the reference number and, if necessary,
the page number(s). The pre-Socratics are mainly quoted from H. Diels, Fragmente
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der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., 17th ed., Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin 1954
(I use the standard notation: Diels I 4B 35 refers to the fragment 35 in Section B of
Chapter 4 in the 1st volume) or G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Scho:eld, The
Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983 (the
reference is: Kirk, Raven and Scho:eld plus page number); otherwise a special indi-
cation will be made. Other references in the text use the name of the author and the
reference number, except sources which are mentioned by the full title. The titles of
the books and papers listed in the bibliography at the end are always given in the
language of the original. If English translation or a further edition is added, page ref-
erences are to them. All non-English single words or nominal phrases are written in
italic when they occur outside quotations. All quotations closely preserve the original
with two exceptions: (a) double-spaced print, sometimes used in older German writ-
ings, is replaced by italic (for instance, ‘n a m e’ by ‘name’); (b) Greek words are
replaced by their Latin transliterations but without accents. The last remark applies to
all Greek words used in this paper. The work on this paper was supported by The
Geneva–Lausanne IRIS Project on the Philosophy and History of Logic. I thank Prof.
Kevin Mulligan, the director of this project, for his help. In particular, he corrected
my English and made several very valuable comments.
(D1) I am not an expert in classics. My remarks in this section rely heavily on the
material which I have found in writings of other people. The most important works
which I employed are: Levet [18] and Komornicka [15]. Both books are more linguistic
than philosophical, contain very rich material (I cannot take into account all registered,
also in writings by other authors, linguistic and historical facts) and provide a very
reliable starting point for further philosophical analysis. Of course, my report is also
governed by some principles and perhaps prejudices. I try to :nd compromises between
competing interpretations, using as a guide the rule, already mentioned, that eclecticism
is sometimes sound. In general, I rely more on linguists than philosophers, and I regard
etymological studies on philosophical terminology as indispensable for understanding
concepts. There is a book, quite extensive (263pp.), by Richard Herbertz [13] entirely
devoted to the concept of truth in ancient Greek philosophy. This book completely
neglects etymological and linguistic problems and embeds the discussed questions only
into very general philosophical views (naive realism, idealism, scepticism, rationalism,
etc.). I do not deny that the history of philosophical concepts should by closely re-
lated to philosophical standpoints, but I claim that it must be supplemented by a solid
linguistic knowledge. It is particularly important that we have at our disposal explicit
de:nitions of relevant terms and their meanings must be extracted from contexts and
diNerent usages. The archaic concept of truth is a good example. First statements which
can be considered as attempts to give de:nitions of truth appear not earlier than in
Plato. My general view is that the philosophical usage of a term (in the present case,
the counterpart of “truth” in archaic and ancient Greek) was related to the archaic
one. If we assume, as I do, that philosophy and science is a continuation, at least in
some respects, of ordinary life and ordinary ways of thinking, then it is not without
interest to investigate which theory of truth concurs with a natural development of
philosophical terminology, that is, with its transition from the pre-philosophical stage
to the philosophical stage. I
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2. Archaic Greece
Aletheia is the most important Greek counterpart of our ‘truth’; alethes (true),
alethos (truly) and alethein (to speak the truth) are related words. However, the Greek
“truth-family” is much more comprehensive and consists of 14 words, among oth-
ers (adjectives): atrekes, nemertes, adolos, ortos, apseudos, etymos and etetymos. It
is characteristic that several words, including aletheia also, belonging to this variety
begin with ‘a’. The most common interpretation of this lexical phenomenon it to con-
sider ‘a’ as a sign of privativum, that is, as a negative noun or adjective. This under-
standing of aletheia was proposed by Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, Olimpiodoros and
the so-called Lexicon Gudianum in antiquity (see [20, pp. 12–13; 9, pp. 222, 375]). In
our times, it was recalled by Leo Myers in his in1uential Handbuch der griechischen
Etymologie (1901) and popularized by Rudolf Bultmann (see [2, p. 239]): “aletheia—
etymologisch das Nicht(s)-verheimlichen—bedeutet”. According to this interpretation,
we should consider such words as complexes of the following structure: a-letheia, a-
trekes, a-dolos or a-pseudos; nemertes can be understood in a similar way, because
‘ne’ functions as ‘a’, that is, as an indicator of a privative character. As far as the
matter concerns aletheia, its etymology is derived as a + lethe + suQx. Aletheia as a
noun occurred with so-called verba dicendi, that is, verbs like Greek counterparts of
“to tell” or “to hear”. So much about matters of lexicology and a simple grammar. Of
course, semantic matters are much more important. Very schematically, if V (aletheia),
where the letter V stands for a verbum dicendi, represents an aletheia-context, to V an
aletheia consisted in issuing a concrete sentence in the present tense about something,
usually supported by direct experience, particularly seeing (see [1,29, pp. 68–71]).
Then, applications of aletheia-contexts were extended to past and future events. Fi-
nally, aletheia became an abstract noun, denoting a property of sentences (judgements,
etc.); examples documenting this development will be given in what follows.
(D2) Many discussions about aletheia are strongly in1uenced by Martin Heidegger’s
philosophy of truth (see [11]). I will not enter into details of Heidegger’s theory of truth
and restrict myself only to his remarks about the archaic and pre-Socratic meaning of
aletheia. Heidegger agrees that this word is a privativum. According to him, aletheia
principally means Unverbogenheit, “disclosure” or “un-concealedness” and stands in
opposition to Verbogenheit, “closure” or “concealedness”; a more colloquial reading,
namely “which is not hidden” is proposed in [9, p. 221]. Heidegger derives his inter-
pretations from the analysis of the famous allegory of the cave in Plato’s Republic.
The fragment 515 with the word alethes (the truth, the true) is crucial here. The En-
glish translation runs as follows: “Then the prisoners would in every way believe that
the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts” (Plato, Republic 515c,
transl. by G. A. M. Grube, rev. by C. D. C. Reve, in Plato, Complete Works, ed.
by J. M. Cooper, and D. S. Hutchison, Hackett, Indianapolis 1997); another possible
rendering of alethes in this context is “which is the true”. Heidegger translates this
word as unverbogene, that is, disclosed or unconcealed, and agrees that aletheia is a
privativum. It is clear that the linguistic material used by Heidegger is extremely poor
and is limited to two occurrences of the crucial word; the second is the fragment 515d
(my italic): “[: : :] if we pointed to each of the things passing by, asked him what
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each of them is, and compelled him to answer, don’t you think he’d be at a loss and
he’d believe that things he saw earlier were truer than the one he was now being
shown?” Thus, although Heidegger followed the canonical approach to etymology of
aletheia, he was guided in his analysis mainly by personal de:nite intuitions concern-
ing the concept of truth. Heidegger derived from his reading of Plato very far-reaching
consequences. He argued that the pre-Socratic philosophers had only the ontological
concept of truth which meant the disclosure of being; according to Heidegger, the fur-
ther course of philosophy changed this sound understanding of truth and introduced
the epistemological concept of truth as something in the mind. The Heideggerian inter-
pretation of aletheia was strongly criticized by FriedlSander (see [9, pp. 221–229]). He
pointed out that Heidegger overlooked the ambiguity of aletheia which meant in Plato,
“reality of being and correctness of apprehension and assertion” (p. 227). In order to
demonstrate Heidegger’s errors, FriedlSander suggests that the interpretation of aletheia
as a privativum is perhaps not correct, however, without outlining a :rm alternative.
FriedlSander was criticized by Luther (see [22, pp. 34N]) who insisted (also in [20, pp.
11–12]) that the canonical interpretation of aletheia was right. He also agrees that the
archaic usage of this word was entirely ontological. It seems that FriedlSander looked
for an alternative interpretation of aletheia just in order to criticize Heidegger. It is a
surprising strategy, particularly if no alternative is even sketched. FriedlSander’s other
and more serious argument is that aletheia as a privativum occurs only once in the ar-
chaic texts (in Hesiod’s Theogony where the sea god Nereus is described as a-pseudos
and alethes). Luther replies (p. 34) that one can :nd further examples in Sophocles
and Euripides. FriedlSander’s strongest argument points out Heidegger’s interpretation is
semantically not admissible: “Thus, in the one case where in early times alethos is un-
derstood as a-alethos, it has nothing to do with the hiddenness of being, but designates
a person who does not forget or neglect, who does not lose something out of sight
or mind; in short, it means exactly the “correctness of perception”, which Heidegger
in his sketch of the words (
 (& and (
 (
 attributes to a period of the decline
of Greek thought.” (p. 223). It is clear that this argument may hold even if aletheia
occurred very frequently in the archaic Greece as a privativum. Now, it is beyond
any doubt (see below) that aletheia and cognate words are ambiguous. FriedlSander
might be still right even if there are no reasons to say that alethes in archaic Greek
meant only and exactly the “correctness of perception”. In order to reject Heidegger’s
interpretation it is quite suQcient to demonstrate, and it is rather a simple task, that
aletheia expressed various contents. Heidegger is, of course, right that Plato’s words
translated as “truth” and “truer” did not express epistemological relations but proper-
ties of being; clearly, Plato had in his mind forms as true or truer being. On the other
hand, the meaning attributed to aletheia word by Heidegger was rare or secondary (see
[29, pp. 145–146, note 92] for a brief summary of objections against Heidegger). The
translation of Republic 515c—“Then the prisoners would in every way believe that the
true being is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts.”—probably adequately
renders Plato’s intuitions. However, the discussion is diQcult, because we encounter
here an intervention of philosophical insights (perhaps even a priori) into etymological
analysis. Anyway, it seems that neither Heidegger nor Luther proved that the basic
usage of aletheia in archaic Greek was purely or even mostly ontological. And this
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is a crucial point for philosophers. In order to complete this digression, I would like
to note that the relation of Luther to Heidegger is quite complex. In Luther 1935 we
read:
“Die Grundbedutung von lethe liegt in Richtung der deutschen Konzeptionen “ich
bin verborgen, verdeckt, verhSullt”. [: : :]. Von den ermittelten Grundkonzeption aus
erklSart sich ferner die Privatbildung aletheia [: : :]. Ihre etymologische Bedutung is
“Unverborgenheit”. (p. 12)
Speaking about “deutsche Konzeptionen” Luther alludes to Heidegger, who is men-
tioned, with a great respect, a few pages earlier. On the other hand, Luther in his
later study (see [22, pp. 172–173]) considered Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato on
truth as completely mistaken. To sum up: for Luther, (a) aletheia is a privativum;
(b) aletheia means disclosure, but only in early Greek philosophy (see also the next
section); (c) the concept of truth in early Greek philosophy was ontological; (d) Plato
was a predecessor of the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, the main disagreement
between Luther and Heidegger was how to interpret Plato, although it is still not quite
clear whether the former understood (particularly, in [21]; [22] by Unverbogenheit the
same as Heidegger did.I
What about meanings of the words belonging to the truth-family? It is convenient to
consider adjective-forms. Alethes can also be translated by “unhidden” (also contrasted
with “silent” or “forgotten”), atrekes by “not disformed”, nemertes by “fautless”, ado-
los by “not deceitful”, ortos by “simple-minded” (or “not double-faced), apseudos by
“truthful”, etymos and etetymos by “real”, “actual” or “authentic”. The inspection of
these meanings (or ambiguities, if you like) immediately shows that words from the
truth-family express ontological, epistemological and moral contents, often combined
in utterances used in ordinary situations. Particular items from the truth-family could
be used and were used interchangeably. It is certain that dialogues in Homer’s poems
were modelled on ordinary dialogical situations in which to say “it is true” and “it is
actual” means the same; the same situation occurs in our contemporary life. Concrete
dialogical exchanges are very sensitive to lying, deceiving, etc. and, thus, truth was
contrasted rather with lying than falsehood; it seems that in archaic Greek there was no
sharp diNerence between lying and uttering false sentences. Although the word pseu-
dos became the most popular from the Greek falsehood-family, this variety includes 67
items, that is, much more than the truth-family; it is indirect evidence that lying and
deceiving impressed Greeks more than telling truth. It is possible the moral and onto-
logical dimensions of aletheia and related words were earlier, but their constructions
with verba dicendi indicate that the epistemological usage was also not absent in the
archaic employment of language. Krischer [17], Snell [27], Snell [28] and Komornicka
[15] point out that aletheia indicated that a state of aNair is real or actual in relation
to the epistemic state of the teller or knower. On the other hand, according to these
authors, etymos is more (or purely) ontological and refers to purely or fully actual
states of aNairs, independently of any involvement of epistemic states. Bultmann [2, p.
239] thinks that aletheia possessed both aspects, but the ontological was more basic.
It is not my aim to discuss which view is correct. What I can derive from this account
is that the epistemic factor early supplemented the ontological one (assuming that the
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latter was really prior). Thus, we have no reason to deny that “to tell truth” in archaic
Greek also expressed “to tell as things are”. On the other hand, since there was no
philosophy surrounding this language, it is diQcult to look for explicit philosophical
contents associated with truth-talk in which the archaic aletheia was involved, for ex-
ample, to consider the problem of truth-bearers (although it is possible to maintain that
“to say aletheia” was understood as “to issue a true utterance”) or the relations of
truth to logic (there was no logic at that time).
(D3) We do not know who originally formulated the Liar paradox and in which
wording. Diogenes Laertios (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr. by R. D. Hicks, Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1925, 2, 108) attributes it to Eubulides of
Megara (see also [4,26]). Diogenes Laertios seems to be the :rst who used the la-
bel “the Liar” for this paradox which is semantically the antinomy arising from self-
referential use of the predicate “is false”. That the paradox in question was baptized
“the Liar paradox” seems to con:rm the view that there was lack of a sharp distinc-
tion between lying and saying falsehoods. See also the next digression and Epidemides’
fragment quoted there.I
(D4) Three texts from the transition of the archaic to philosophical period are in-
teresting. (A) Epimenides, the Cretan (Diels I, B1 3): “Cretans always lie” (profasis,
pseudai); (B) Solon (Diels I, 10 6: “Don’t lie, tell truths” (ne pseudos, all’ aletheie);
(C) Pittakos (Diels I, 10 12): “Take care about piety, [: : :], common sense, truth
(aletheias), [: : :], friendship.” These are instructive fragments. Epidemines accuses Cre-
tans of always deceiving; however, (B) is not equivalent to the Liar paradox. Pittakos
locates truth among other personal virtues. Both fragments clearly point out the moral
dimension of telling the truth and lying. One can conclude that since Solon was the
legendary legal reformer, his words apply to legal matters (perhaps “Don’t lie before
the court”). On the other hand, several of the preserved Solon maxims have nothing
to do with the law. Since all can be interpreted as principles of practical wisdom, one
can say that also (C) oNers a moral prescription. Moreover, the second part of (C)
possesses the crystalline grammatical structure: verbum dicendi (all’) plus aletheie. It
is interesting that the ontological interpretation of (C) seems to be quite arti:cial, while
the epistemological one (tell about things as they are) looks fairly natural.I
(D5) I :nally sketch an interpretation of the archaic aletheia developed by Deti-
enne (see [7]). He, following Vernant, looks for a general social context in which
“truth-talk” arose. In particular, Detienne points out that habits concerning aletheia
were formed by religion (in fact, Aletheia had a divine personi:cation as a daughter
of Zeus), myths, poetry, and legal (truth as justice) and political practices. Detienne
(p. 49) constructs two sequences. One (positive) consists of Praise, Speech, Light,
Memory and Aletheia, and the second (negative) includes Blame, Silence, Darkness,
Oblivion and Lethe. Detienne argues that there was no sharp opposition (contradiction)
between positiva and negativa (the same point was noted by Heitsch [12, p. 31]), but
elements of the particular parts were partly contrastive and partly complementary; they
form, according to Detienne, a semantic :eld (a type of structural linguistic). I will not
discuss this topic, because I do not see special pro:t in applying a fairly controver-
sial linguistic theory to our problem; similarly, the hypothesis appealing to prelogical
thinking explains very little, if anything at all. It is suQcient to note that aletheia and
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pseudos were regarded as diNerent, at least in the time of the Seven Sages (see (C) in
(D4) above). Of course, Detienne collects well-known facts, for example, the connec-
tion of light and truth. However, I think that Detienne exaggerates in insisting on the
connection between truth, and memory and tradition. Certainly, there are reasons for
understanding “true” as “present in memory or tradition” or “false” as “forgotten”, but
one should note that, due to the lack of other records, memory and tradition functioned
as sources of knowledge or conditions of the possibility of telling truth, particularly
about the past. Similarly, the prophetic power also associated by Detienne with the
archaic uses of aletheia had an obvious link with the already mentioned extension of
application of truth-talk to the future. Thus, there is nothing in the facts pointed out
by Detienne which obliged us to abandon the interpretation of the archaic aletheia as
“tell as things are”.I
2.1. Pre-Socratics
No preserved fragment of the philosophers from Milet speaks about truth by using
aletheia or an other word from the Greek truth-family. I do not know how to explain
this fact. Interests of the Miletians in the philosophy of nature do not provide any hint,
because their way of doing philosophy does not prevent one from thinking about truth.
Also nothing is achieved if one points out that perhaps relevant writings disappeared,
because if the Miletians spoke about truth, it would be recorded by secondary sources.
For instance, Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians, Book I, tr. by R. G. Bury,
in Against the Professors, vol. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1925)
reports many views about truth but does not mention the Miletians in this context. Inci-
dentally, the silence of the :rst philosophers of nature about truth should be particularly
astonishing for the adherents of the ontological understanding of aletheia, because if
this word primarily refers to the world, it should be used by the Miletians. Still more
surprising is that aletheia does not occur in the Pythagoreans in spite of their interests
in mathematics, ethics and practising advanced deductive reasonings. Historically, it
was Xenophanes of Colophon who spoke about truth in two preserved fragments of
his writings (Kirk, Raven, Scho:eld, p. 179): (a) No man knows, or ever will know,
the truth about the gods and about everything I speak of; for even if one chanced to say
the complete truth, yet oneself knows it not; but seeming is wrought over all things.
(b) Let these things be opined as resembling the truth. The :rst fragment contains a
word tetelesmenon, also, although seldom, used in archaic Greek for truth; fragment
(b) employs etymos. The word aletheia occurs once in Heraclitus (Diels I 22B 112;
unfortunately, this fragment is not translated in Kirk, Raven and Sho:eld), when he
says that wisdom consists in saying the truth. And this is everything that can be found
in writings by the older philosophers of nature (including Heraclitus), the Pythagoreans
and the :rst of the Eleatics.
(D6) The lack of words belonging to the Greek truth-family in the Miletians,
the Pythagoreans and also the so-called younger philosophers of nature (Empedocles,
Anaxagoras) does not preclude attempts to reconstruct concepts or even theories of
truth presumably maintained by these philosophers, because the lack of de:nite words
does not entail the lack of related concepts. Such reconstructions are based on general
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views held by particular thinkers and their remarks about related questions, for instance,
ways of cognition, and began to be practised even in ancient times. For example, Sextus
Empiricus (Against the Logicians I, 115) informs us that Empedocles gave six truth-
criteria; considerations about methods of knowledge-acquisition gave rise to theories of
truth-criteria. In (D1) above I mentioned Herbertz 1913. This book tries to outline the
truth-theories of several “silent” philosophers. For example, Herbertz derives the theory
of truth of the Miletians from their naive epistemological realism. However, it is (see
(D1) above) not a convincing approach. The most advanced analysis of this kind is to
be found in Luther [22]. He uses not only general views of particular philosophers but
also their concrete statements. For instance, Luther observes that something follows for
the problems of truth from remarks of Alcmaeon of Croton about clarity and exactness
of cognition, from Heraclitus’ ideas of logos and reason as well as from his remarks
about the fallibility of senses, from Empedocles’ theory of experience, from Anaxago-
ras’ account of nous or from Democritus’ view that there are two ways of cognition:
obscure (via senses) and true (via intellect) (see Diels II 68B 9–11; Kirk, Raven and
Sho:eld, pp. 409–410); it is interesting to note that Democritus used the truth-talk in
a more abstract way than it did earlier.I
(D7) Luther reconstructs truth-theories of pre-Socratics as ontological. It is surprising
in some cases, because he often derives his conclusions from typical epistemological
categories, like clarity, exactness, logos, reason or sense-experience and its properties.
Thus, Luther extends his account of aletheia to views expressed in a new vocabulary.
One point requires in my opinion some critical comments. Luther argues that early
Greek historians, notably Herodot, understood truth ontologically. Luther (p. 88) reports
that Hekataios of Milet, a historian (one generation before Herodot, that is, about 500
B.C.), used the word aletheia in his description of his way of writing history. He says
that he will write what the truth (aletheia) is, according to his experience; thus, his
use was more abstract than the ordinary one, but still coloured by personal experience.
Also Herodot, who is regarded as the :rst methodologist of history, speaks about true
(alethes) reports about the past. Kahn (see [14, passim]) quotes several veridical uses
of “to eon” (to be) in Herodot; for instance (pp. 352–353):
“He should not have told the truth [legein to eon], if he wanted to lead the
Spartans on an expedition into Asia.”
“Cleomanes asked Crius this, and the latter told him what was [to eon] (told him
truth).”
Luther admits that Hekataios and Herodot (by the way, Herodot’s examples show
how aletheia-contexts were used in concrete cases) wanted to show that historical
truth is the task of writing history. Yet he insists that both understood aletheia (and its
substitutes) as an ontological category. Is it not simpler to say that methodologically
self-conscious historians were interested in telling things as they are? We also have a
very interesting fragment in Thucydides (History of the Peloponesian War I, XX.2,
tr. by C. Foster Smith, Heinemann, London, 1919):
“So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth [aleteias], and
so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at the hand.”
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I do not know whether Luther would be ready to include Thucydides (he was a contem-
porary of Socrates) among the ontologists in truth-theory. It is clear that the replacement
of “truth” by “reality” transforms the quoted fragment into not quite coherent text. It
proves that Thucidydes understood aletheia in an epistemological manner; moreover,
his understanding is abstract and intersubjective. In fact, he commented on obstacles
to the apprehension of historical truth, that is, the correct report of how things were.
Moreover, we should rather look at the link between Hekatoias and Herodot, and
Thucydides, which is much more comprehensible, than the commitment of the histori-
ans to disclosure as the meaning of aletheia. I do not insist that locutions with aletheia
and alethes in Hekatoios and Herodot are completely devoid of ontological aspects, but
I think that Luther’s interpretations are too one-sided for his philosophical prejudices
concerning the ontological use of aletheia as basic.
If we inspect (a) and (b), it is clear that Kahn’s translations assume that telling
truth consists in telling as things are (were, will be). It supports the view that truth-
talk in archaic Greek was not limited to the ontological dimension of aletheia and its
equivalents. Since I regard this matter as fairly crucial, the following comment is in
order. Even if we say that aletheia concerns things or being, or that it is about things
or being, this is not suQcient for the ontological conception of truth. This conception
requires us to consider truth as a feature (I do not enter here into the problem of
the meaning of ‘feature’ in this context) of things or being. Plato in Republic did
that (see (D2)), but there is no convincing evidence that this conception prevailed. Of
course, I do not deny that some uses of aletheia in the pre-Socratics were ontological.
Consider for example, the following fragment of Democritus (more precisely, it is
the report of Sextus Empiricus about Democritus’ views; Kirk, Raven and Scho:eld,
p. 410):
“Democritus sometimes does away with what appears to the senses, and says that
none of these appears according to truth [aletheias] but only according to opinion:
the truth [alethes] in real things is that there are atoms and void.”
Clearly, alethes refers to real things and aletheias can be replaced by “reality” or
“actuality”. On the other hand, truth is here contrasted with opinion (doxas) that also
invites an epistemological reading.I
Heraclitus’ passage about truth does not yield anything new; that wisdom consists
in saying the truth can be implicitly found in Solon or Pittakos (see (D4) above). But
Xenophon’s ideas began a new chapter in the history of epistemology. The fragment
(b) (once more: “Let these things be opined as resembling the truth.”) introduces the
distinction of the utmost importance, namely between opinion and truth, although it
is restricted to theological matters. This distinction became one of the main themes
of Parmenides. There are three important fragments about truth in Parmenides (Kirk,
Raven and Sho:eld, pp. 245, 254–255):
“Come now and, and I will tell you (and you must carry my account away with
you when you have heard it) the only ways of enquiry that are to be thought
of. The one, that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be, is the path of
persuasion (for she attends upon Truth [Aletein]; the other, that [it] is not and that
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it is needful that [it] not be, that I declare to you is an altogether indiscernible
track; for you could not know what is not—that cannot be done—nor indicate it.”
(b) “Here I end my trustworthy discourse and thought concerning truth [aletheies];
henceforth learn the beliefs of mortal men, listening to the deceitful ordering of my
words.”
(c) “It is proper that you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-
rounded truth [Aletheies], and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true
[alethes] reliance. But nonetheless you shall learn these things too, how what is be-
lieved would have to be assuredly, pervading all things throughout.”
The fragments (b) and (c) introduce the distinction between truth and opinion in
a fully general way, not only restricted to a particular :eld as in Xenophon. It is
customary to render this distinction as the contrast between episteme and doxa. Thus,
truth is a property of episteme or we can even say that the domain of truth and the
domain of episteme are identical. Let me only register this function of truth without
further comments, although it deserves them, but perhaps not in the context of the
concept of truth; the history of epistemology from Plato to the Gettier counterexamples
shows that the problem is that of de:ning episteme (knowledge) rather than of de:ning
truth. Thus, there remains a budget of problems connected with (a), in particular the
question of how truth is related to being and existence. It is well known that there are
a number of diQcult issues, additionally strengthened by a cryptic thesis of Parmenides
“For the same thing is there both to be thought of and to be” or (simpler, but not
clearer) “Thought and being are the same”, and a number of proposals about how to
solve diQculties in interpreting Parmenides (see [31] for an extensive discussion). I
cannot enter into this interpretative jungle. Fortunately, my task justi:es a restriction to
a few rather simple remarks: according to Parmenides, truth is extensionally equivalent
to being what justi:es the veridical use of “to on” (to be) (see [14, Chapter VII] for
further discussion). Thus, to say “: : : is” and “: : : is true” is sometimes (of course, not
always) equivalent. Aletheia in this meaning is really an ontological category, pace
Luther, but it is clear that this sense is only one possible sense. Even (a) can be
interpreted more epistemologically if one focuses more on “enquiry” than on “that [it]
is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be”, but the most plausible interpretation
of Parmenides is that he focused on being. Incidentally, the equivalence of truth and
being has plagued philosophy from the Eleatics to the present. The problem concerns
the truth of negative existentials: if truth and being are equivalent, it is mysterious
how it is possible to issue true sentences about objects that do not exist, because non-
existing objects, due to the assumed equivalence, seem to be a contradictio in adiecto
(see [23,24] for a discussion of this problem). Plato was the :rst who tried solve this
diQculty (see below).
For Parmenides, the contrast between being and not-being is sharp and exhaustive:
the product of being and non-being is empty, and there is nothing in between being and
non-being. If we map these principles onto truth, we get the laws of non-contradiction
and excluded middle, no matter whether they are understood ontologically or logi-
cally. In any case, if it was true, as Heitsch and Detienne maintain (see (D5) above)
that aletheia and pseudos were at least partly complementary in archaic Greek, what
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passed away with Parmenides. This is not surprising if we remember that the Eleatics
essentially contributed to the rise of logic, perhaps not logical theory (this had to wait
for Aristotle), but to logical deductive practice. The last question is whether the idea
of correspondence between thought and reality was involved in Parmenides’ thinking
about truth. The answer is “yes” but with various quali:cations. Certainly, not in the
sense which is usually attributed to Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand,
extensional equivalence of true and being (and also the identity of being and thought,
whatever this might mean) strongly suggested that truth is a relational concept be-
cause truth-talk is related to being. Thus, the novelties and problems introduced by
Parmenides into the philosophy of truth were numerous and fundamental, including his
popularization of the word aletheia as a standard one. The role of Parmenides is well
summarized in the following quotation:
The presence and even the possibility of truth is closely related to the Greek
distinction between doxa and episteme [: : :] and their proper objects. Thus there
is really no critical problem until Parmenides distinguishes being from nonbeing,
associates the later with sense perception, asserts that there is no truth in the
phenomenal world of doxa [: : :], and contrasts the latter with the “way of Truth”
[: : :]. As a corollary of this and of the realization of the arbitrary nature of laws
and customs [: : : [, Protagoras propounded his theory of the relativity of truth [: : :].
[25, pp. 16/17]
Protagoras is presumably the author of the :rst work in which the word “truth”
occurs; according to the tradition, he wrote a treatise Aletheia e kataballountes (Truth
or Refuting Speeches). The only fragment which is preserved is the famous passage
expressing the doctrine of man-the-mensura (quotation after Guthtrie [10, p. 183]):
Man is the measure of all things that are that they are, and of things that are not
that they are not.
Typically, the :rst part of this statement is quoted and taken as the formulation of Pro-
tagoras’ relativism and subjectivism: if man is the measure of all things, then everything
is relative or subjective. However, Parmenides, in order to develop his anthropological
views, did not need to add the second part of his maxim; he could rely on practical
and rhetorical premises.
The title of Protagoras’ work suggests that he wanted to refute some views about
truth. It is clear that Parmenides’ absolutism and rationalism were the target for Pro-
tagoras. The sequel to “Man is the measure of all things”, that is the phrase “[things]
that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not” uses the Parmenidean
language. The end of the discussed phrase—“things that are not that they are not”—
clearly contradicts Parmenides who rejected the idea that they are things that are not.
The :rst part, namely “[things] that are they are”, obviously expresses Parmenides’
idea of truth. Protagoras rejected this understanding of truth by admitting that human
opinions dictate the truth and falsehood, that is, decide whether things that are that
they are or whether things that are not that they are not. This view devastated logic
which, as I pointed out above, came into existence with the Eleatics. In fact, Pro-
tagoras maintained that everything is true, Gorgias that everything is false, and both
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views destroyed the principle of contradiction as does, to use contemporary metalogic,
every one-valued logic. I do not deny that discussions of Socrates, Plato and Aristo-
tle with Protagoras and other sophists had enormous historical signi:cance. However,
these debates focused (and still do, see [5]) mainly on the :rst part of his statement
and thereby concealed an important matter which seems relevant for the history of the
concept of truth. Protagoras, in his man-the-mensura maxim, introduced a canonical
language for speaking about truth, although it is not clear whether sentences or sensa-
tions were for him the primary bearers of truth (the same ambiguity is in Democritus).
If we add “to tell truth is to tell” to “of things that are that they are and of things
that are not that they are not”, we obtain a prototype of famous formulas of Plato and
Aristotle (see Kahn [14, p. 367]) that certainly apply to sentences. Thus, Protagoras is
“a corollary” of Parmenides not only for replacing absolutism by relativism, but also
by developing a suitable language in which “The Way of Truth” could be expressed
without poetic allegories. Another important point is that Protagoras who was a typical
epistemologist probably contributed to the rise of the view that truth is in intellect, not
in things. If I am right, then, surprisingly, Protagoras who refuted Parmenides and was
refuted by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, became a link between the Eleatics and the
great Athenians philosophers.
3. Plato
Plato developed the idea of episteme and made it one of the most crucial points
of his philosophy. According to Plato, episteme has its own special subject matter:
the world of forms. Thus, episteme is the true knowledge about the true being. It is
the ontological doctrine of truth, although some authors (see [29, p. 15]) speak about
ontological-epistemological theory of truth in Plato.This section is exclusively devoted
to Plato’s de:nition of true and false sentences (propositions); I leave apart Plato’s
account in Cratylus where he speaks about the truth of names.
Plato’s de:nition of propositional truth is given in Sophist. There are relevant
fragments in two translations (starred passages will appear in the second translation):
I. Sophist, transl. by N. P. White, in Plato, Complete Works, ed. by J. M. Cooper
and D. S. Hutchinson, Hackett, Indianapolis 1997).
(261e–262d): Visitor [of Elea]: [: : :] there are two ways of use your voice of indi-
cating something about being.
Theaeteus: What they are:
Visitor: One kind is called names, and the other is called verbs.
Theaeteus: Tell me what each of them is.
Visitor: A verb is the sort of indication that’s applied to an action.
Theaeteus: Yes.
Visitor: And a name is the kind of spoken sign that’s applied to things that perform
the actions.
Theaeteus: De:nitely.
Visitor: So no speech is formed just from names spoken in a row, and also not from
verbs that are spoken without names.
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Theaeteus: I didn’t understand that.
Visitor: Clearly you were focusing on something else when you agreed with me just
now. What I meant was simply this: things don’t form speech if they’re said in a row
like this.
Theaeteus: Like what?
Visitor: For example “walks runs sleep”, and other verbs that signify actions. Even
if somebody said all of them one after another that wouldn’t be speech.
Theaeteus: Of course not.
Visitor: Again, if somebody said “lion stag horse” and whatever names there are of
things that perform actions, the series wouldn’t make up speech. The sounds he uttered
in the :rst and second way wouldn’t indicate either action or an inaction or the being
of something that is not something that is or of something that is not—not until he
mixed verbs with nouns. But when he did that, they’d :t together and speech—the
simplest and smallest kind of speech, I suppose—would arise from that :rst weaving
of name and verb together.
Theaeteus: What do you mean?
Visitor: When someone says “man learns”, would you say that’s the shortest and
simplest kind of speech?
Theaeteus: Yes.
Visitor: Since gives an indication about what is, or comes to be, or has come to be,
or is going to be. And he doesn’t just name, but accomplishes something, by weaving
verbs with names. That’s way we said that he speaks and doesn’t just name. In fact
this weaving is what we use the word “speech” for.
Theaeteus: Right.
Visitor: So some things :t together and some don’t. Likewise some vocal signs don’t
:t together, but the ones produce speech.
Theaeteus: Absolutely.
Visitor: But there’s still this one point.
Theaeteus: What?
*Visitor: Whenever there’s speech it has to be about something. It’s impossible for
it not to be about something.
*Theaeteus: Yes.
Visitor: And speech also has to have some particular quality.
Theaeteus: Of course.
Visitor: Now let’s turn our attention to ourselves.
Theaeteus: All right.
Visitor: I’ll produce some speech by putting a thing together with an action by means
of a name and a verb. You have to tell me what it’s about.
*Theaeteus: I’ll do it as well as I can.
*Visitor: “Theaeteus sits” That’s not a long piece of speech, is it?
*Theaeteus: No, not too long.
*Visitor: Your job is to tell me what it’s about, what it’s of.
*Theaeteus: Clearly it’s about me, of me.
*Visitor: Then what about this one?
*Theaeteus: What one?
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*Visitor: “Theaeteus (to whom I’m now talking) 1ies.”
*Theaeteus: No one could ever deny that it’s of me and about me.
*Visitor: We also say that each piece of speech has to have the same particular
quality.
*Theaeteus: Yes.
*Visitor: What quality should we say each one of these has?
*Theaeteus: The second one is false, I suppose, and the other one is true.
*Visitor: And the true one says those that are, as they are, about you.
*Theaeteus: Of course.
*Visitor: And the false one says things diNerent from those they are.
*Theaeteus: Yes.
*Visitor: So it says those that are not, but that they are.
*Theaeteus: I suppose so.
(II) Sophist, transl. by F. M. Cornford, in [6, pp. 308–312]).
Str[anger]: Whenever there is a statement, it must be about something; it cannot be
about nothing.
Theaet[eus]: That is so.
Str. “Theaeteus sits”—not a lengthy statement, is it?
Theaet. No, of very modest length.
Str. Now it is for you to say what is about—to whom it belongs.
Theaet. Clearly about me: it belongs to me.
Str. Now take another.
Theaet. Namely?
Str. “Theaeteus (whom I am talking to at this moment) 1ies”.
Theaet. That too can only be described as belonging to me and about me.
Str. And moreover we agree that any statement must have a certain character.
Theaet. Yes.
Str. Then what sort of character can we assign to each of these?
Theaet. One is false, the other true?
Str. And the true states about you things that are (or the fact) as they are.
Theaet. Certainly.
Str. Whereas the false statement states about you things di?erent from the things
that are.
Theaet. Yes.
Str. And accordingly states things that are-not as being.
Theaet. No doubt.
Plato clearly attributes truth and falsehood to sentences as grammatical units with
a de:nite structure: noun+verb. Neither nouns (names) nor verbs (predicated in our
present sense) can be quali:ed as true or false. The relevant de:nitions that can be
extracted from both translations are as follows: (I) A sentence A about an object
O is true if and only if A says about O things those that they are, as they are; A
sentence A about an object O is false if and only if A says about O things diNerent
from those that are; (II) A sentence A about an object O is true if and only if A
states about O things those that are (or the facts) as they are; A sentence A about
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an object O is false if and only if A states about O things diNerent from the things
that are.
Cornford (pp. 311–314) adds comments. He writes
[: : :] the notion [of truth] is that truth consists in the correspondence of the state-
ment with the ‘things that are’ or ‘the facts’. How they correspond is not explained.
(p. 310)
Conford gives what he takes to be an explanation in the name of Plato. Assume that
the sentence ‘Theaeteus sits’ is true. It is so because ‘Theaeteus’ stands for Theaeteus,
‘sits’ stands for sitting, and ‘Theaeteus sits’ corresponds to the existing fact, namely:
Theaeteus sitting. And further we read:
Here each of the two words stands for one element in the complex fact. The
statement as the whole is complex and its structure corresponds to the structure
of the fact. Truth means this correspondence. (p. 311)
However, Plato speaks nothing about correspondence or about facts. Thus, Cornford’s
explanation is an overinterpretation of what Plato literally said. Clearly, Conford tries
to reconcile Plato with the correspondence theory of truth in its modern version (truth
as the correspondence with facts).
(D8) There is one point which I have deliberately neglected. It concerns the problem
of how false statements are possible. This question is nearly considered when one
speaks about Plato’s theory of propositional truth (see, for example, [19] and a very
extensive treatment in [29, Part II]). Plato considered these questions in Theaetus
187–200 and Sophist 237–246, 259–263. This last indication shows that Plato’s quoted
de:nitions of truth were given in the context of his considerations about the possibility
of the false. I did not enter what is said in the Theaeteus because we do not :nd
in this dialogue any de:nition of truth; Plato speaks there about truth, falsehood and
episteme. Look at the following fragments: (Ia) Visitor: Whenever there’s speech it has
to be about something. It’s impossible for it not to be about something. (Ib) Visitor:
And the false one says things diNerent from those they are. Visitor: So it says those
that are not, but that they are. (IIa) Str[anger]: Whenever there is a statement, it must
be about something; it cannot be about nothing. Str. Whereas the false statement states
about you things di?erent from the things that are. (IIb) Str. And accordingly states
things that are-not as being.
There is an interesting diNerence in translation. In (Ia), Visitor/Stranges says that
if there is a speech about something, it cannot be not about something, but in (IIa),
Visitor/Stranger seems to derive another conclusion about speech: since speech must be
about something, it cannot be about nothing. Let us agree for the sake of argument that
if I say about nothing, I do not say anything about Theaetus. Platon insisted that it is
impossible to speak about nothing. Provided that classical logic is used, he was right.
Saying something about nothing would have to have the form “nothing is P”, where
“nothing” functions as a term. Since nothing as the denotation of “nothing” has to be
individuated, we have further that there is something which is nothing, which gives a
contradiction. This proves that the sentence “nothing is P” has no model, that is, it is
not about anything. If we will conventionally de:ne that “not something (anything) =
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nothing”, we can say that if it is necessary for speech to be about something, thereby it
is impossible to be about nothing. Consider now the crucial sentence “Theaetus 1ies”
in circumstances provided by Plato, that is, in the situation where Theaetus sits. One
can say that the sentence ‘Theaetus 1ies’ is about nothing. Conford says (p. 313) that,
according to this interpretation, our sentence is about a non-existing fact (p. 313).
Plato ascribes to Visitor/Stranger the following inference: if a sentence states about
an object O things diNerent from those that are, then it entails that the things that
are not, are. The Visitor/Stranger came from Elea and he exposed Parmenides’ theory.
Let us assume that the Parmenidian logic licensed the inference (I do not assert that
it is so): if “a is P” is true and “a is Q” is false, then the latter is about nothing.
Certainly, predicate logic invalidates this reasoning. We have only this: if “a is Q”
is false, then “it is not the case that a is Q” is true (perhaps “a is non-Q” is true).
Since individual constants in predicate logic are not empty (in strict accordance with
Plato’s claim that speech must be about something), we can perfectly well say that the
sentence “Theaetus 1ies” is about Theaetus, but it is false (or states false things about
Theaetus, or states about him things that are not). The problem is how to understand
phrases like “things that are”. There is no trouble if we regard them as expressing
predications, but diQculties arise when the purely existential meaning is attributed to
them.I However, I would like to add three more remarks.
It a very common thing to say that Plato’s analysis of false sentences was a reply
to the Sophists. As a matter of fact, Protagoras (see above) maintained that everything
was true, but he did not argue from logical considerations but with the help of the
man-the-mensura principle. I do not deny that Plato was against the Sophists, but it
seems that he also refuted Parmenides in this case. Plato’s argument was very simple:
if “a is P” is true and it implies “a is non-Q”, then “a is Q” is false. Therefore, false
sentences about something are possible.
I will not follow Conford’s interpretation of Plato on truth. I think that if we want
to do justice to the text, we should stay with a simple interpretation suggested above:
a sentence is true if it says about its object things as they are, and false if it say
things as they are not. This assumes that the phrase “they are” is understood as an
abbreviated predication. In contemporary terminology, we can express this in such a
way: a sentence “a is P” is true if and only if it says about a things as they are, that
is, says that a is P.; otherwise it is false.
(D9) Translation of Plato by Nicolas White, is much more closer to the original
Greek text than Cornford’s translation. As far as I know, to translate the classics in a
way more conforming ordinary Greek or Latin became now a standard. The way of
translating is signi:cant for philosophical interpretations. White’s translation does not
allow us to interpret Plato’s theory of truth as a correspondence theory without further
ado.I
4. Aristotle
There is no question that Aristotle was the most in1uential person in the philosophy
of truth. There is a selection of the Stagirite statements about truth (I will mention
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various translations in cases in which diNerences seem signi:cant) : E–Aristotle, Cat-
egoriae, De Interpretatione, transl. by E. M. Edgill, in The Works of Aristotle, ed.
by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1928; A—Aristotle’s, De Interpreta-
tione, transl. by J. L. Acrill, At the Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963; C—Aristotle, On
Interpretation transl. by H. P. Cooke, in Aristotle in 23 Volumes I, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983; R—Aristotle, Metaphysics, transl. by W. D. Ross,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1924; K—Aristotle, Metaphysics, Books , , and
E, transl. by Ch. Kirvan; due to Aristotle’s signi:cance for the Middle Ages, I also in-
clude Latin translations (indicated by (L)) of some fragments after Aristoteles Latine,
editit Academia Regia Borussica, Georgius Reimer, Berolina, 1831):
(A1) Categorie 14b
(E) “The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that
he is, and the implication is reciprocal: if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege
that he is true, then he is. The true proposition is, however, in no way the cause of
the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the
cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends
on the fact of the man’s being or not being.”
(A2) De Interpretatione 19a 35
(E) “A sea-:ght must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that
it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place,
yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since
propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a
real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding aQrmation
and denial have the same character.”
(A) (Omitting the :rst sentence)“[: : :], since statements are true according to how
the actual things are, it is clear that wherever these are such as to allow of contraries
as chance has it, the same necessarily holds for contradictories also.”
(C) (Only the middle sentence) “[: : :] as the truth of propositions consists in corre-
sponding with facts.”
(L) (Only the middle sentence) “[: : :] cum orationes similiter verae sint atque res
[: : :].” (transl. by Julius Pacius)
(A3) Metaphysics 1011b
(R) “Falsehood is saying of that which is that it is, or that what which is not, that
it is not; truth is saying of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is
not. Therefore, he who says that a thing is or not is, says what is either true or false.
But if the subject is a middle term between contradictories, neither that which is nor
which is not is being said to be or not to be.”
(K) “[: : :] for to say that which is not or that which is not is, is a falsehood; and
to say that which is and that which is not is not, is true; so that, also, he who says
that a thing is or not will have the truth or be in error. But it is said that neither that
which is nor that which is not either is not or is.”
(L) “[: : :] dicere [: : :] ens non esse aut hoc esse, falsum: ens autem esse et non esse,
verum est. Quare et qui dicit esse aut non esse, verum dicet aut mentietur, sed nec ens
dicitur non esse aut esse, nec non est”. (tr. by Bessarion)
(A4) Methaphysics 1027b
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(R) “Being as truth and not-being as falsity depend on a putting together and a
taking apart; both together are concerned with the partition of a pair of contradictory
propositions. [: : :] true judgement aQrms when the subject and predicate are in fact
combined, denies when they are separated, while the false does the opposite; how
thinking things together or separately takes place is another question [: : :]. [: : :] falsity
and truth are not in things [: : :], but in thoughts.”
(K) That which is as true and that which is not as falsehood are concerned with
composition and division and, taken together, with the apportionment of a contradiction.
For truth has the aQrmation in the case of what is compounded and the denial in the
case of what is divided, while a falsehood has the contradictory of this apportionment.
(How we come to conceive things together or separately is another question) [: : :]. [: : :]
Falsehood and truth are not in actual things [: : :] but in thoughts.”
(L) “[: : :] verum, ens et non ens, ut falsum quonian circa compositionem et divi-
sionem est, et omnino circa partitionem contradictionis. Verum etnim aQrmationem in
compositio habet, negationem vero in diviso, falsum vero huius partitionis contradic-
tionem quo autem modo quod simul aut quod separatim est, intelligere accidat, alia
ratio est. [: : :] Non enim est falsum et verum in rebus [: : :] sed in mente.” (tr. by
Bessarion)
(A5) Metaphysics 1051a–b
(R) “‘Being’ and ‘not being’ are used with reference (1) to the categories, (2) to
potency and actuality, (3) to truth and falsity. Truth means thinking that to be divided
or united which is divided or united, respectively; error means being in state contrary
to the facts. When is truth present? You are not white because we truly think you are,
but vice versa.”
(L) (Restricting to the counterpart of “Truth means thinking that to be divided or
united which is divided or united) “Quamombren verum dicit, qui divisum dividi et
compositum componi putat, falsum autem, qui contraquam res se habeant, aut quando
sunt aut not sunt.” (tr. by Bessarion)
Aristotle clearly distinguishes being qua being and being qua truth (see (A5)). Since
truth and falsehood is in thoughts (see (A4)), not in things, we can interpret this dis-
tinction as one between an ontological and one epistemological concept of truth, and
regard Aristotle as advocating the epistemological account of truth. Another certain
point is that the Stagirite closely connects truth, falsehood and logic, defending (see
(A3)) principles of contradiction and the excluded middle, yielding the law of biva-
lence (see, however, (D10) below). Truth is independent of concrete acts of thinking
(see (A1), (A5)) which do not cause something to be true or false; the causal re-
lation goes rather from the world to truths as formulated by people. Also Aristotle
(see (A4)) makes a distinction between truth and its criteria. Although Aristotle is
not quite explicit about bearers of truth, we can assume that sentences, propositions
or statements play this role (see (A2); in the Greek original the word logoi occurs).
Aristotle in many respects continues Plato’s path in thinking about truth and strength-
ens it; he also adds something new, particularly as far as logic is concerned. After
all, his theses about this topic are ordered, interconnected and this is what shows
that we have here to do with the :rst full-blooded theory of truth in the history of
philosophy.
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Fragments of (A3)–(A5), more precisely locutions (a) Falsehood is saying of that
which is that it is, or of that which is not, that it is not; truth is saying of that which
is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not. (b) True judgement aQrms when
the subject and predicate are in fact combined, denies when they are separated, while
the false does the opposite. (c) Truth means thinking that to be divided or united
which is divided or united, respectively; error means being in state contrary to the
facts, look like attempts to de:ne the concept of truth. The statements (b) and (c)
express approximately the same thing. However, under the literal interpretation, (a) is
diNerent. The main point is that (a) applies to existential propositions (a exists, or a
does not exist), but (b) and (c) to that composed of subject and predicate (‘a is b’, ‘a
is not b’). The interpretation of (b) and (c) is easier. Let us say that the structure ‘a
is b’ expresses that the subject a and the predicate b are combined, and the structure
‘a is not b’ expresses that they are divided. Here we are at the level of language.
On the level of things, we have combination and division of substances, the primary
substance denoted by a and the secondary one denoted by b. Now, we can say that a
sentence is true if combination (division) on the level of language is properly related to
combination on the level of substances; otherwise it is false. This explanation cannot be
extended to existential sentences in a straightforward way. Why did Aristotle introduce
this dualism? One explanation is that (a) appears in the context of Aristotle’s polemics
against Protagoras. The formula (a) is an extension of the-man-the-mensura-principle
(see Kahn [14, p. 367] to the eNect that Protagoras introduced the prototype of (a) into
Greek philosophy), and Aristotle simply used the language of his philosophical enemy
when he criticized him. Aristotle’s task consisted in defending the principle of excluded
middle against sophistic attacks and perhaps he wanted to carry out the defence by
adopting Protagoras’ truth-talk. However, if we accept Kahn’s view (see Kahn [14, pp.
331–370]) about the veridical use of the Greek counterpart of “be” (esti, einai), then a
new perspective is opened up. According to Kahn (see p. 367) the formula “that what
(instead of “which”, but it does not make any diNerence) is” is to be understood as
“what is so”. If we take this hint, (a) means (see [14, p. 336]): (a1) To say what of
is (so) that it is and of what is (not so) that it is, is falsehood; to say of what is (so)
that it is and of what is not (so) that it is not, is true. This reading makes (a) closer
to (b) and (c), and now we can say that the latter explains what “what is (is not) so”
means.
A separate, but related problem concerns whether Aristotle gave a version of the
correspondence theory of truth. According to Cavini [4, p. 87], (A1) is an informal
statement of the equivalence of the type “A is true if and only if A” (T-equivalence).
This point is important because T-equivalences is a stable ingredient of any correspon-
dence theory of truth. However, two remarks are here in order. Firstly, T-equivalence
is only a part of the correspondence theory of truth, not the whole theory. Secondly,
Cavini’s interpretation must be quali:ed by observing that a causal nexus is involved in
the Aristotelian formulation, but typical later versions, in particular, contemporary for-
mulations of T-equivalence, are devoid of any such factors. On the other hand, the idea
that the truth of a sentences is rooted in the world, but facts are independent of their
assertions, was always accepted by advocates of this theory. (A2) is of special interest
in this context. The relevant fragment in the Greek original goes: (G) est epei honoios
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oi logoi aletheis hosper ta pragmata. It is the :rst part of a compound sentence of
which the second part asserts that both contrary contingent statements about the future
(that is, “the sea-battle will be tomorrow” and “the sea-battle will not be tomorrow”)
have the same character, that is, are possible (I will not enter into the famous prob-
lem of future contingents). (E) translates (G) as “Since propositions correspond with
facts”, which is certainly wrong since it neglects the word aletheis; clearly, (G) says
something about true propositions, not propositions. The problem with (A) and (C) is
that the connection between both parts of the whole sentence is mysterious, because
it is not clear how truth as the correspondence with facts makes both contrary future
contingents together possible. Independently of that, one may note that no word in (G)
justi:es using the word “correspondence”, “corresponds” or similariter (as in (L)). In
this respect, (A) is much better, but it suggests too much in my opinion, because it
employs the phrase “the actual things” which is burdened by quite a rich philosophical
content. I think that (A) should be translated literally, something like: “Just because
statements are true according to how things (events, facts, etc.) are”. This clearly indi-
cates that the double possibility of contrary future contingents depends on how things
are or rather will be. Nothing more, unless we decide to follow Jan  Lukasiewicz and
apply three-valued logic to this issue.
J. L. Ackrill says in his comments on (A): “[Aristotle] seem to hold a rather crude
realistic correspondence theory of truth.” (p. 140). Ackrill (like many other commen-
tators; I will mention them later, but see Carretero [8] for an extensive treatment of
Aristotelian theory as based on the concept of correspondence) takes this quali:cation
as granted and beyond all doubt. However, I see little justi:cation for this interpreta-
tion. Certainly (G) is not suQcient. More promising are (A4) and (A5). Both seem
to invite the concept of correspondence, but as an interpretative device, and not as
something provided by the literal meaning of those fragments. A good summary of the
problem is to be found in Kahn [14, p. 367]:
“As we have seen [: : :] the classical formula given by Aristotle—to say of what
that it is and of what is not that is not—merely articulates the pattern of the ordinary
veridical idiom in Greek. Wherever their full structure is clear, these uses of einai are
characterized by an explicit comparison, formulated by ontos : : : os between an essive
clause which expresses how things are, were, or will be, and an intentional clause with
a verb of saying or thinking. [: : :] As in the most contemporary idiom so in Homer
and Sophocles: the man who speaks the truth “tells it like it is”, and the liar tells it
otherwise.
This informal facCon de parler leaves open many of the philosophic issues involved
in a correspondence theory which conceives truth as some kind of relation between
language and the world. This idiom speci:es only that there is some relation of this
kind, such that it admits a comparison between its terms, that one term is to be found
in what is said or thought, the other in what is actually the case, and that the truth
depends upon some point of similarity or agreement (ontos : : : os) between two.”
Yet I think that Kahn goes too far, because “agreement”, “similarity” and “compar-
ison” are dangerous words, unless they are taken in a very informal way. If that is the
case, I would cancel the word “comparison” and the very last clause, namely, “that
truth depends, etc.”. The fragment Metaphysics 1011 B expresses the basic Aristotelian
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intuition concerning the concept of truth which, as further history shows, was consid-
erably obscured by explanations, like (A4) and (A5). It is interesting that Metaphysics
1011 B can be seen as a development of the classical scheme “verbum dicendi plus
aletheia”. In fact, develops the meaning of aletheia hidden in traditional usages. In
order to see this link, it is enough to rephrase the passage in question as “To say
falsehood is to say what of is (so) that it is and of what is (not so) that it is; to say
truth is to say of what is (so) that it is and of what is not (so) that it is not.” Aristotle
here takes the last step toward an abstract treatment of aletheia in the antiquity. Tarski
did the same things in the 20th century by embedding the concept of truth into a pre-
cise metalogical conceptual scheme. If we agree that Aristotle re:ned the ordinary use
of aletheia, we should also recognize that Tarski’s de:nition, following Metaphysics
11 B, determines the concept which is not at odds with the everyday linguistic practice.
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